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I Introduction
In 1997, Tiger Woods took the sports world by storm with a record-
breaking performance at the 1997 Masters golf tournament in Augusta,
Georgia.' Alabama resident Rick Rush, a life-long sports fan, also attended
the tournament.2 More significantly for Woods, Mr. Rush is a painter who
specializes in painting sports subjects Inspired by Woods's phenomenal
victory, Rush began work on what became the subject of a bitter and costly
lawsuit- a painting entitled The Masters ofAugusta.' Rush's publisher, Jireh
Publishing, Inc. (Jireh), made over 5,000 copies ofthe painting and sold them
to the public.' Impelled by what he perceived to be the exploitation of his
identity, Tiger Woods, via his marketing company, ETW Corp. (ETW), filed
suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
against Jireh, seeking an injunction and damages.'
Woods based his lawsuit, in part, on a rapidly evolving area of the law
known as the "right of publicity."7 The right of publicity is a quasi-intellec-
tual property right that protects the pecuniary interest of an individual's
identity In ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publishing, Inc.,' the district court consid-
ered whether the First Amendment's protection of expression shields an artist
from liability when he appropriates the likeness of a celebrity without license
or consent.'" The case concerned a painting that depicted professional golfer
1. See Marcia Chambers, LawsuitPitsArtists'Rights vs. Athletes', N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16,






6. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000), appeal
docketed, No. 00-3584 (6th Cir. 2001).
7. See id. at 830-31 (summarizing plaintiff's allegations).
8. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983)
(explaining nature of right of publicity).
9. 99 F. Supp. 2d 829 (N.D. Ohio 2000), appeal docketed, No. 00-3584 (6th Cir. 2001).
10. See ETW, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment
on ETW's right of publicity claim). In ETW, the underlying dispute involved a claim by Tiger
Woods's licensee, ETW Corp., that Jireh Publishing reproduced and sold lithographs of a
painting of Mr. Woods at the Masters Golf Tournament in violation of the Lanham Act and Mr.
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Tiger Woods in three different poses against the backdrop of the Master's
Golf Tournament." Woods's marketing agent, ETW, sued Jireh for, inter
alia, hifingement of Woods's publicity rights. 2 In its opinion, the court ruled
that the First Amendment protected Rush and his assignee, Jireh, from
Woods's right of publicity claim, allowing Jireh to copy and sell prints of
Rush's painting without license from, or giving proceeds to, ETW."3 The
court's decision was consistent with the trend toward broader First Amend-
ment protection of artistic expression and the concomitant erosion in the value
of publicity rights. 4
In contrast, the assignee ofthe "Three Stooges"' publicity rights, Comedy
H Productions, Inc., sued a California artist for selling t-shirts and prints of
his rendering of the famous trio and won $225,000 in damages. 5 In Comedy
IllProductions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., the California Court of Appeals
rejected the defendant's First Amendment argument, stating that although art
is generally protected by the First Amendment, "reproductions of an image,
made to be sold for profit, do not per se constitute speech."' 7 The court ruled
Woods's right of publicity. Id. at 830. Subsequently, ETW brought suit against Jireh Publish-
ing for the misappropriation of the name and likeness of Tiger Woods under several intellectual
property theories. Id. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on trademark infringement claims (Counts One through Five), stating that ETW failed to
establish the validity of its claim to trademark rights in the image of Tiger Woods. Id. at 831-
34. The court also granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on ETW's claim that
Jireh Publishing violated lTiger Woods's right of publicity (Count Six), asserting that the print
was a work of art which enjoys fll First and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of expression
protection. Id. at 834-36.
11. See id. at 830 (summarizing facts of case).
12. Id. at 830-31.
13. Id. at 835.
14. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity, 9
DEPAUL-LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. & POL'Y 35, 60 (1998) (noting recent opinions doubting
continued viability of regulations that restrict commercial speech).
15. See Comedy IlI Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464,466 (Cal.
1998), aff'd, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (relaying facts and procedural history of case).
16. 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464 (1998), aff'd, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
17. See Comedy i, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470 (stating that reproductions of art do not
necessarily receive First Amendment protection). In Comedy 1U1, The California Court of
Appeals addressed the issue of whether the reproduction of a charcoal rendering of the Three
Stooges on t-shirts and lithographs for sale to the public violated a California law that protected
publicity rights. Id. at 466. The court rejected the defendant's argument that this use of the
Three Stooges likeness fell outside of CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(a). Id. at 467. The court deter-
mined that the defendant had sold the likeness itself, rather than the likeness "on or in products,
merchandise, or goods," noting that t-shirts clearly fall within the ambit of § 990. Id. Likewise,
the court rejected the defendant's argument that § 990 addresses only advertising uses. Id. at
468. Further, the court rejected the claim that § 990's exemption for newsworthy material
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that art does not necessarily convey any message, emotion, or idea and,
therefore, is not protected per se. 8 The California Supreme Court affinmed
the court's judgment but for different reasons. 9 Rather than relying on the
lower court's reasoning that reproductions are not entitled to First Amendment
protection,2" the California Supreme Court ruled that "depictions of celebrities
amounting to little more than the appropriation of the celebrity's economic
value are not protected expression under the First Amendment."'" Although
ETW and Comedy HI were litigated under differing publicity rights laws, the
First Amendment issues are identical.' Nonetheless, the results and reasoning
of the two decisions are at complete odds.' This contradiction illustrates the
continued uncertainty regarding the breadth of First Amendment protection
in publicity rights cases.24
This Note explores the friction between the right of publicity and the
First Amendment's protection of expression.' Parts L.A and I.B examine the
evolution of the publicity right from its humble beginnings as a right of
privacy tort to its current incarnation as a commercial interest recognized in
applied to these facts. Id. The court reasoned that the material, not the person, must be of
newsworthy value, otherwise all celebrities would be exempted because they are inherently
newsworthy. Id. Turning to the defendant's claim that its use was a form of expression pro-
tected by the First Amendment, the court ruled that even if the image was individually drawn,
rather than copied, it did not necessarily follow that it expressed any message, idea, or emotion.
Id. at 470. Further, the court posited that even if the original drawing was protected expression,
the First Amendment does not protect the reproduction and sale of copies. Id. at 471. The court
agreed, however, that the injunctive relief granted to the plaintiff was overly broad and, there-
fore, reversed the injunction, while affiming the damages imposed at trial. Id. at 472.
18. Comedy ll, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470.
19. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 (Cal. 2001)
(ruling that Saderup's work was not sufficiently transformative and that his depiction of "The
Three Stooges" merely exploited trio's fame).
20. Id. at 799.
21. Id. at 805.
22. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (N.D. Ohio 2000),
appeal docketed, No. 00-3584 (6th Cir. 2001) (evaluating defendant's First Amendment de-
fense); ComedyiLf, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 469-71 (same).
23. Compare ETW, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 836 (N.D. Ohio 2000) (stating that art deserves full
First Amendment protection because it seeks to express a message) (citing with approval, Berry
v. City of New York, 97 F3d 689,695 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that "[art] always communicate[s]
some idea or concept to those who view it, and as such are entitled to full First Amendment
protection)), with Comedy 11, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 470 (asserting that not all art contains
expression protected by First Amendment).
24. See generally Zimmerman, supra note 14 (discussing unsettled relationship between
publicity rights and First Amendment).
25. See infra Parts EIl-IV (examining tension between publicity rights and First Amend-
ment and attempting to reconcile these competing interests).
TIGER'S PAPER TIGER: ENDANGERED RIGHT OFPUBLICITY 1159
just over half of the states.26 Part II examines the justifications for vigorous
First Amendment protection of expression and the ramifications of minimal
protection.' Part HI explores the growing tension between freedom of expres-
sion and the right of publicity." Part IV examines the various approaches
employed by courts and commentators to reconcile these competing interests
and proposes an alternative approach that protects the right of publicity inter-
est without "chilling" free expression.' Part V applies this alternative ap-
proach to the facts of ETW ° Finally, Part VI concludes by examining the
ramifications of this proposal. 1
It should be noted at the outset that this Note is not intended to be either
ajustification or a criticism of publicity rights generally. Although the author
believes that the concept of publicity rights is constructive and deserving of
general adoption, this Note does not attempt to support or rebut the volumi-
nous commentary regarding the right of publicity's legitimacy.32 As Steven
Getzoff, Chairman of the American Bar Association's Taskforce on Feder-
alizing the Right of Publicity, noted in regard to the establishment of pub-
licity rights, "the genie is out of the bottle," and the right of publicity is here
is to stay.
33
A. Evolution ofPublicity Rights
The right of publicity is a relatively new doctrine that developed as an
offshoot of the right of privacy.34 In their seminal article, The Right to Pri-
vacy, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis contended that people had a
26. See infra Part IA-B (examining evolution of and justifications for right of publicity).
27. See infra Part H (examining justifications for and restriction of First Amendment
protection of expression).
28. See infra Part I (exploring growing tension between First Amendment and right of
publicity).
29. See infra Part IV (examining alternative approaches to reconciling conflict between
First Amendment and right of publicity and proposing restitutional remedy that would compen-
sate plaintiff for portion of profits arising from appropriation of celebrity's likeness).
30. See infra Part V (applying proposed alternative to ETW).
31. See infra Part VI (examining ramifications ofproposal's adoption).
32. See generally Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case For a Kantian Right ofPub-
licify, 49 DLKELJ. 383(1999) (proposing Kantian right of publicity); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70
IND. L.J. 47 (1994) (advocating property and liability rule analysis); Zimmerman, supra note 14
(criticizing justifications for publicity rights).
33. Symposium, Rights ofPublicity: An In-Depth Analsis of the New Legislative Pro-
posals to Congress, 16 CARDOZOARTS & ENT. L.. 209,219 (1998).
34. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b (1995) (noting
origins of right of publicity doctrine).
1160 58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 1155 (2001)
right to be left alone.35 Subsequently, Dean Prosser argued for legal recogni-
tion of a right of privacy which could support four distinct causes of action:
(1) unreasonable intrusions upon the seclusion of another, (2) public disclo-
sure of private facts, (3) false light portrayals, and (4) the misappropriation of
an individual's name or likeness.3" The right of publicity sprang from this
fourth prong of privacy rights, the misappropriation of an individual's iden-
tity.
3 7
Curiously, the interests protected by the modem right of publicity bear
little resemblance to the justifications for its tortious ancestor.38 Originally,
the misappropriation of identity tort was designed to compensate an individual
for the emotional distress that resulted from the victim's witnessing an unau-
thorized use of her identity.39 Over the last century, however, this tort evolved
into a legally cognizable property interest that protects an individual from an
unauthorized commercial exploitation of her identity.4"
Sixty-three years after Warren and Brandeis argued for recognition ofthe
right of privacy, a court recognized the right of publicity as a separate cause
of action.41 In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.,42 the
Second Circuit coined the term "right of publicity," while determining which
of two chewing gum companies owned exclusive rights to the image of a
baseball player on its trading cards.43 The court concluded that "a man has a
35. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193,
195 (1890) (quoting Judge Cooley).
36. See W. PAGE KEETONET AL., PROSSERAND KEETONONTELAW OF TORTS § 117, at
851-68 (5th ed. 1984) (detailing four prongs of right of privacy).
37. See REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OFUNFAIRCOMPETIION § 46 cmt b, 529 (1995) (noting
historical connection between publicity rights and right of privacy).
38. See Laura Lee Stapleton & Matt McMurphy, The Professional Athlete's Right of
Publicity, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.. 23,30-32 (tracing evolution of right of publicity).
39. See WILLIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 804-07 (4th ed. 1971)
(stating requirement of emotional injury to recover damages in misappropriation of identity
variation of invasion of privacy tort).
40. See J. Thomas McCarthy, The Sping 1995 Horace S. Manges Lecture - The Human
Persona as CommercialPropery: The Right ofPublicity, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 129,
130 (1995) (stating that publicity rights allow individuals control over commercial uses of their
identity).
41. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866,868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(naming interest "the right of publicity").
42. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
43. Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(recognizing "the right of publicity" as separate tort from right of privacy). In Haelan, the plain-
tiff sued a rival bubble gum company for infringing on its exclusive right to use a ballplayer's
image on its trading cards. Id. at 867. While acknowledging its use of the player's image, the
defendant claimed that plaintiff's contract was merely a waiver ofthe ballplayer's privacy rights,
TIGER'S PAPER TIGER: ENDANGERED RIGHT OFPUBLICITY 1161
right in the publicity value of his photograph." 4 The court deemed a celeb-
rity's interest in protecting his or her identity to be a pecuniary interest rather
than a dignitary interest, which privacy law was designed to protect.45
Since Haelan, courts and commentators continue to cultivate the right of
publicity, the latter most notably in Thomas McCarthy's The Rights ofPublic-
ity and Privacy,46 Melville Nimmer's seminal article The Right ofPublicity,47
and the Restatement (Third) ofUnfair Competition.41 The enthusiastic support
for publicity rights displayed in Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc.49 is a good
example of the doctrines's positive reception." In Factors, the assignee of
Elvis Presley's publicity rights sought both damages and a permanent injunc-
tion prohibiting the defendant from marketing Elvis memorabilia.51 The case
involved a poster consisting of a photograph of Elvis Presley captioned "In
Memory." 2 The defendants claimed that the right of publicity was contrary
to and preempted by the federal copyright laws.53 The court disagreed, reason-
ing that the right of publicity covered an area that federal law did not reach
and was not equivalent to the general scope of copyright law. 4
and not a grant for the exclusive use of the image. Id. The court disagreed, ruling that an
individual has a "right of publicity" in his identity. Id. at 868. The court further reasoned that
it is the exclusivity of this right that makes the celebrity's image valuable. Id. Without this right,
the use of the celebrity's image would yield nothing. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. (recognizing that many celebrities are not very concerned with "having their
feelings bruised through public exposure of their likeness").
46. See generally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLCITY AND PRIVACY (2d
ed. 2000) (delineating contours of publicity rights doctrine).
47. See generally Melville Nimmer, The Right ofPubicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
203 (1954) (justifying and defining parameters of right).
48. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPE=mON §§ 46-49 (1995) (delineating
scope and use of publicity rights doctrine).
49. 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
50. See Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(awarding injunctive relief and damages in face of First Amendment defense). In Factors, the
plaintiff assignee of Elvis Presley's publicity rights alleged that the defendant exploited the
name and likeness of Elvis Presley, in violation of his publicity rights, by marketing a poster
featuring a photograph of Elvis with the caption "In Memory" overlaid. Id. at 1092. The
plaintiff moved for summary judgment seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the defen-
dants from marketing Presley memorabilia and an order directing further proceedings to
determine damages. Id. at 1093. Despite copyright preemption and First Amendment defenses,
the court granted the permanent injunction and awarded damages equal to the amount of profits
received by the defendant for its sale of Elvis merchandise. Id. at 1104.
51. See id. at 1092 (summarizing background of case).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1095.
54. Id. at 1100.
1162 58 WASH. &LEE L. REV 1155 (2001)
The defendants also asserted a First Amendment defense, claiming that
the posters commemorated a newsworthy event and, therefore, were protected
speech." The court dismissed the defense, stating that the Second Circuit
previously considered and rejected this argument."' In conclusion, the court
reaffirmed its initial ruling that Elvis Presley's right of publicity was neither
contrary to nor preempted by federal copyright law and that the First Amend-
ment did not prevent the assertion of this right.5 Consequently, the court
ordered a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from marketing
Elvis memorabilia and awarded damages equal to the amount of profits
received from the sale of the poster.58 The plaintiff's complete victory con-
notes the right of publicity's early enthusiastic acceptance.5 9
Today, twenty-seven states recognize a statutory or common law form of
the right of publicity.60 This patchwork of statutes and common law protects
an ever-widening range of identity, including name, 1 likeness, 2 voice6 3 and
numerous other attributes associated with an individual.' Despite the popu-
larity of this cause of action, a model right of publicity statute has not yet been
formulated.
65
55. See id. at 1103 (noting that although decision on preliminary injunction does not
conclusively determine all issues, both district court and court of appeals previously decided




59. See Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 44-45 (noting that right of publicity quickly gained
credibility).
60. SeeJ.THOMASMCCARThY, THERIGHTsoFPUBLIYANDPRIvACY§6.1[B](Isted.
1987 & Supp. 1999) (surveying state right of publicity law).
61. See McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 923 (3d Cir. 1994) (concluding that plaintiff
actor only held superior publicity rights to his television character's name if he could establish
that people identified him with that name).
62. See Comedy mII Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464, 467 (Cal.
1998), affd, 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (imposing liability for defendant's sale of "Three Stooges"
likenesses on t-shirts and prints).
63. See Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
deliberate imitation of distinctive singer's voice for commercial purposes violated singer's pub-
licity rights).
64. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (ruling
that district court erred in rejecting Vanna Whites's right of publicity action involving use of
robot mimicing White's likeness and duties on Wheel of Fortune game-show in commercial);
Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831,836 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that
defendant invaded plaintiff's right of publicity because defendant intentionally appropriated
plaintiff' s identity for commercial purposes).
65. See Symposium, supra note 33, at 210 (discussing need for uniform right of publicity
statute to replace patchwork of law now in place throughout United States).
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Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.6 is the only right of
publicity case to reachthe Supreme Court.' The central issue in Zacchini was
whether the First Amendment protected a news program's broadcast of the
plaintiff's entire "human cannonball" act.' The defendant asserted that the
act was newsworthy and, therefore, was entitled to full First Amendment
protection.69 The plaintiff maintained that although the act might be newswor-
thy, the broadcast of the act in its entirety effectively deprived him of its
commercial value.7" The public would be less willing to pay for that which
they could see for free on television.7' The Supreme Court agreed.72 Al-
though the Court upheld Zacchini's publicity rights in the face of a First
Amendment challenge, it failed to demarcate a clear line between the First
Amendment and the right of publicity.7 3 However, the Court added legitimacy
to the infant doctrine by defining it expansively and by finding liability even
in the face of a First Amendment challenge.74 Thus, the Zacchini Court
provided at least some ammunition for the right of publicity's supporters
against First Amendment challenges.
B. Justifications for the Right of Publicity
In Zacchini, the Supreme Court stated the following:
The rationale forprotectingthe right ofpublicityis the straight-forward one
ofpreventingunjustenrichmentbythetheftofgoodwill. No socialpurpose
66. 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
67. See Zacehini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578 (1977) (denying full
First Amendment protection to those -who infringe on individual's right of publicity). In
Zacchini, the underlying dispute involved the broadcast of Zacchini's "human cannonball" act
on the television news. Id. at 563-64. Despite Zanchini's explicit instructions not to broadcast
the entire act, a local television station aired the entire fifteen-second performance on its news
broadcast the next day. Id. Respondant maintained that the cannonball act was newsworthy
and, therefore, entitled to full First Amendment protection. Id at 569. The Court disagreed and
ruled that the petitioner's right of publicity was violated and that the First Amendment did not
exempt the respondent from liability. Id. at 578-79.
68. See id. at 564-65 (stating central issue of ease).
69. Id. at 569.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 576.
72. Id. at 578-79.
73. See Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 49-50 (distinguishing Zacchini court's holding
because it concerned appropriation of act, rather than identity or image, and thus was more akin
to works of authorship, which are protected by copyright).
74. See id. at 45 (noting that "Zacchini lent the right of publicity a legitimacy that un-
doubtedly encouraged it to extend its reach").
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is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that
would have market value and for which he would normally pay.7 5
Zacchini's reasoning begs the question: what is unjust enrichment? The Re-
statement of Restitution states, "A person is enriched if he has received a
benefit... [a] person is unjustly enriched if the retention of the benefit would
be unjust.'.7 6 In Zacchini, the Court found that although the First Amendment
generally protects the press's right to broadcast images of the subject of a
newsworthy event, the broadcast of the plaintiff's entire act was a misappro-
priation of his publicity rights and, therefore, unjust.77 Although Zacchini
held that the plaintiff's right of publicity claim outweighed the defendant's
First Amendment interest, the First Amendment poses the most serious threat
to the continued vitality of the publicity rights doctrine.78
IL. First Amendment Protection of Expression
Courts are quite resistant to attempts to limit First Amendment activity. 9
As Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Reinhardt opined, "[tihe first amendment [sic]
is at the heart of our democratic system of government. It is the most funda-
mental of our rights and liberties."8" Although persuasive justifications for
vigorous application ofthe First Amendment exist,"' expression is not immune
from limited restrictions.'
A. Justifications
Despite Zacchini's favorable treatment of publicity rights in the face of
a First Amendment challenge, numerous courts and commentators have
75. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (quoting Kalver, Privacy in TortLaw- Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB., 326,331 (1966)).
76. RESTATEMENT OF RESTrr oIoN § 1 cmt. a (1937).
77. See Zacchini 433 U.S. at 576 (1977) (noting that broadcast of petitioner's entire act
threatened his ability to earn living).
78. See Michael J. HigginsA Pitch for the Right ofPublicity, INTELL. PROP. MAG., Dec.
1998 (LEXIS, Legal News Publications File) (discussing development of First Amendment
argument to attack publicity rights).
79. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech, Information as Goods:
Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665, 681
(asserting that Supreme Court jurisprudence does not permit government or private parties to
interfere with dissemination of ideas except under extraordinary circumstances).
80. Crane v. Az. Republic, 972 F.2d 1511, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992) (Reinhardt, C.J.,
concurring).
81. See infra Part ILA (noting traditional justifications for First Amendment's protection
ofspeech and expression).
82. See infra Part IB (recognizing legal restrictions on First Amendment activity).
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warned that an expansive publicity right regime would be detrimental to
society's interest in full freedom of expression.8' One argument contends that
political freedom is dependent upon a full and rich public domain of informa-
tion to fuel it. 4 Indeed, "public common" proponents include many early
speech theorists who placed great value on the right to borrow from others in
the advancement of knowledge.8" As Robert Burton explained to his readers
in The Anatomy ofMelancholy, "[tihough there were many Giants of old in
Physick and Philosophy,... [a] dwarf standing on the shoulders of a Giant
may see farther than a Giant himself."86
Another persuasive justification for First Amendment guarantees is that
free speech facilitates our innate need for self-expression." This position
argues that "freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individ-
ual self-filflment."'  To this end, the mind must be free from the repression
of ideas, beliefs, and expression or risk non-realization ofhuman potential and
83. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976
(10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that application of Oklahoma's right of publicity statute creates
overprotection of raw materials vital to creative expression); ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc.,
99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 834 (N.D. Ohio 2000), appeal docketed, No. 00-3584 (6th Cir. 2001)
(noting that publicity rights are limited by public's right to know and by press's freedom to dis-
seminate information); Michael Madow, Private Ownership ofPublic Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127,143 (1993) (arguing that celebrity images are raw
materials out of which individuals and groups establish their "presence, identity, and meaning"
(quoting PAULWImE TAL., COMMONCULTURE: SYMBOLC WORKATPLAYiNTHEVERYDAY
CULTURES OF THE YOUNG (1998)); Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 53, 76 (arguing that
commodification of personality that depredates public domain violates freedom of speech).
84. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant/Appellee Jireh
Publishing, Inc., For Affirmance at 23, ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., (6th Cir. 2001) (No.
00-3584) (citing Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Con-
straints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999)) (arguing that
restrictions on public domain endanger FirstAmendment freedoms). See generally Zimmerman,
supra note 79 (same).
85. See Zimmerman, supra note 79, at 679 (summarizing "public common" argument).
86. Id. at 679-80 (citing ROBERT BURTON, THE ANATOMY OF MELANCHOLY (Floyd Dell
& Paul Jordan-Smith eds., Tudor Publ'g Co. 1955) (1628)).
87. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804, 807 (1978) (White, 3.,
dissenting) (explaining that individual self-expression is one principle justification for con-
stitutional protection of speech afforded by First Amendment); Kwall, supra note 32, at 66
(noting prominent justifications for First Amendment's free speech guarantees) (citing Ronald
K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Commerce & Communication, 71 TEX. L. REV. 697, 733
(1992) (recognizing that individual self-expression is one primary justification for freedom of
speech); Helene Bryks, Note, A Lesson in School Censorship: Hazlewood v. Kuhlmeier, 55
BROOK. L. REV. 291,310 (1989) (noting that self-expression is major justification for freedom
of speech)).
88. THOMAS L AM ON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (Vintage Books
1971).
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character.89 To limit the search for, or the expression of, truth is to elevate the
state over the individual. 0
B. Restrictions on Expression
The reverence bestowed upon free expression does not mean that speech
is immune from restriction.1 Although expression receives broad FirstAmend-
mentprotection, the United States Supreme Courthas upheld the constitutional-
ity of numerous federal acts, state statutes, and local ordinances that limit
expression.92 Examples include the following: political advertising,' draft
card mutilation,94 unlicensed parades,95 solicitation,' the use of fighting
words,' and various broadcasting restrictions.' Thus, the First Amendment,
though mighty, is not absolute.' As with other constitutional protections, the
First Amendment's reach is relative to those interests with which it competes. 1 0
For example, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 1 the Supreme Court concluded that
picketers protesting working conditions imposed by their employer did not
have a First Amendment right to picket a private shopping mall." In this
89. Id
90. Id.
91. See infra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (noting valid restrictions on speech).
92. See infra Part ILB (surveying legislative restrictions on expression).
93. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,304 (1974) (upholding right of city to
accept commercial advertising on city-owned buses, while rejecting political advertising).
94. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 386 (1968) (affirming conviction of war
protester who burned his draft card in violation of federal statute prohibiting draft card mutila-
tion).
95. See Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569,576 (1941) (upholding ordinance requiring
permit for all parades and public meetings so long as accompanied by procedural safeguards).
96. See Heffron v. Int'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981)
(upholding state regulation limiting solicitation at Minnesota State Fair to assigned booth).
97. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951) (upholding disorderly conduct
conviction of protester whose conduct constituted incitement to riot).
98. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (upholding FCC's restrictions on
"seven dirty words" from radio broadcasts during hours that children would likely hear them).
99. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618,623 (1995) (distinguishing commer-
cial speech from "speech at the First Amendment's core"); Greer v. Spook, 424 U.S. 828, 842
(1976) (recognizing that "First Amendment rights are not absolute under all circumstances").
100. Cf Went For It, 515 U.S. at 623-24 (discussing Court's Central Hudson test that
evaluates magnitude of governmental interest in regulation of speech with breadth of restriction
on that speech).
101. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
102. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,521 (1976) (ruling that striking employees had
no First Amendment right to enter privately owned shopping center and advertise strike against
employer). In Hudgen, striking warehouse employees picketed their employer's retail store
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case, the free speech rights of the picketers conflicted with private property
rights of the shopping mall owner."l 3 The Court rejected the picketer's claim,
reasoning that the First Amendment does not give to those who wish to
express themselves the freedom to trespass on the private property rights of
others."' Hudgens is analogous to many publicity rights cases in that it
concerned a conflict between one party's First Amendment rights and the
property rights of another. 05 Publicity rights proponents argue that speakers,
like those in Hudgens, do not have a First Amendment right to use another's
publicity right as a vehicle for their speech. 6
C. Chilling Effects ofPior Restraint
Courts are particularly critical of restrictions that act as a prior restraint
on speech.1" In Bery v. City of New York,"c the Second Circuit examined a
city ordinance that limited the ability of street artists to sell their art on city
in a privately-owned shopping center. Id. at 508. After an agent of the center threatened to
have them arrested for trespass, the strikers left. Id. at 509. Subsequently, the union to which
they belonged filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Nation Labor Relations Board
(NLRB), alleging interference with rights protected under § 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act Id. The NLRB entered a cease and desist order against the shopping center owner, rea-
soning that the employees enjoyed a First Amendment right to picket the store. Id. at 51o. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the NLRB
to reconsider the case in light of the intervening decision in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S.
551 (1972), which held that persons protesting the military operations in Vietnam had no First
Amendment right to distribute private handbills concerning the Vietnam war in a shopping
center. Id. Again, the NLRB concluded that the shopping center had committed an unfair
labor practice. Id, at 510-11. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order, concluding that the
Board had sustained its burden of showing that no adequate alternative location existed which
was less intrusive on the shopping center owner. Id. at 511-12. The Supreme Court vacated
the Court ofAppeals judgment, ruling that the striking employees had no First Amendment right
to enter the shopping center and advertise their strike against their employer. Id. at 520-21, 23.
The Court remanded the case to the NLRB to resolve the conflict between the private property
rights of the shopping center owner and the striking employees. Id. at 523.
103. See generally id. (adjudicating conflict between First Amendment rights of picketers
and property rights of mall owner).
104. See id. at 1036 (noting that Court's constitutionaljurisprudence does not require dedi-
cation of private property to public use) (citing Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 568-69
(1972)).
105. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 8:31-32 (analogizing shopping center cases to
conflict between First Amendment and right of publicity).
106. See id. (comparing property right versus speech issues in shopping mall cases to right
of publicity cases).
107. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,70 (1963) (noting that systems of
prior restraints on expression are presumptively unconstitutional); see also Near v. Minmesota,
283 U.S. 697,713 (1931) (same).
108. 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996).
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property.109 The court held that the City of New York's licensing requirement
for street vendors violated their First Amendment rights to free expression."o
Speaking for the court, Judge Robert Carter noted that a speaker does not lose
constitutional protection merely because he profits from it."' More impor-
tantly, Bery struck down a restrictionthat resulted in a "de facto bar" of expres-
sion." 2 The court recognized that less intrusive restrictions would pass Consti-
tutional muster while serving the city's interest of keeping the sidewalks free
of congestion. 13 The court's primary concern was the chilling effect that the
city's "de facto bar" had on expressive output." 4 The court concluded that no
suitable alternative market existed for these artists, and thus, under the licens-
ing regime, they would likely not engage in the protected activity.115 In its
opinion, the court cited United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union,1 in Which tle Supreme Court ruled that the government's ban on
public employees receiving honoraria was a restriction that chilled speech
before it occurred, which would inevitably curtail expressive output.' Thus,
109. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 698 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that city's
requirement that artists be licensed to sell art-work on sidewalks violates First Amendment).
In Bery, a group of artists appealed a district court order denying their request to enjoin
enforcement of a licensing ordinance which required them to obtain a license to sell their art on
city sidewalks. Id. at 691-93. The district court ruled that the ordinance was a content-neutral
restriction which did not violate the First Amendment, although it had the incidental effect of
limiting the sale of art on the sidewalks of New York. Id. at 692-93. On appeal, the city argued
that the licensing ordinance did not prohibit the artists from expressing themselves because they
were still able to create and display their artwork. Id. at 695. Rather, the ordinance only
restricted the sale of it. Id. The Court of Appeals disagreed, noting that "[i]t is well settled that
a speaker's rights are not lost merely because compensation is received." Id. at 695-96. Finding
that the ordinance was not tailored sufficiently narrowly to meet a content neutral requirement,
the Court of Appeals reversed, and held that the ordinance violated the First Amendment rights
of the artists. Id. at 697-98.
110. Id.at698.
111. Id. at 696.
112. See id. at 697 (noting that lack of available licenses effectively bars artists from selling
their art on sidewalks).
113. See id. at 698 n.8 (illustrating less restrictive alternative, such as that employed by
City of San Francisco, which limits sales to certain areas with lottery to assign spots).
114. See id. at 696 (noting that without incentive of payment, plaintiffs would not have
engaged in protected expressive activity).
115. See id. at 698 (concluding that New York's vending restriction failed to provide
alternative channel for artistic expression).
116. 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
117. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995)
(reasoning that banning government employees from accepting honoraria would chill speech by
acting as disincentive to engage in protected expression). In NTEU, the Court was faced with
the issue of whether a ban on federal employees receiving compensation for making speeches
or writing articles violated their First Amendment rights to free speech. Id. at 457 The United
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the regulation was an impermissible prior restraint on speech." 8
The potential to chill free expression, enunciated in Bery, is perhaps the
greatest danger that publicity rights pose in the merchandising context.
Because merchandise often contains elements of both expression and appro-
priation, an overly broad right of publicity regime diminishes both the
speaker's incentive to engage in expression and the public's opportunity to
appreciate such expression or to be informed by it. 19 The added uncertainty
as to the breadth ofthe First Amendment's protection only adds to the chilling
effect posed by such restrictions. 2 '
MII. Growing Tension Between First Amendment and Publicity Rights
As noted above, general academic acceptance ofthe right of publicity has
been thwarted by concerns that the right of publicity too often infringes on the
First Amendment and limits information available in the public domain. 2'
Indeed, a jurisprudential trend has developed toward limiting the applicability
of the right of publicity in the face of First Amendment challenges.' " The
inconsistent application of First Amendment protections to the right ofpublic-
ity, coupled with the lack of conformity in the various statutory and common
law incarnations of the right has confounded those who would assert and
defend this right.12
A. Settled Uses
Although distinguishing between protected and unprotected uses remains
a difficult proposition, the history of publicity rights jurisprudence suggests
that some uses of another's publicity rights are more constitutionally protected
States Supreme Court affirmed the injunction against enforcement of the statute as to the respon-
dents based largely on the chilling effect the act would have on speech by low-level federal
employees. Id at 468-70. The Court reasoned that the honoraria ban would inhibit the employ-
ee's output ofinformation and diminish the corresponding value to society in receiving it. Id.
118. Id.
119. Cf. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 696 (2d Cir. 1996) (reasoning that
licensing restriction would diminish incentives to create, thus having detrimental effect on
society).
120. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 8:9 (noting that uncertainty regarding First Amend-
ment creates "chilling effect" on speech).
121. See Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 76 (expressing concern that publicity rights limit
public domain).
122. See supra Parts II A-B (surveying publicity rights cases involving First Amendment
issues). But see White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1401-02 (9th Cir. 1993)
(ruling that parody as form of commercial speech is not protected by First Amendment).
123. See Stapleton & McMurphy, supra note 38, at 30 (noting difficulty of applying right
of publicity doctrine given confusion over its legal basis).
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than others.'24 For example, a newspaper's use of a picture and name of a
celebrity is generally protected by the First Amendment."z InMontana v. San
Jose Mercury News, Inc.,126 the former quarterback for the San Francisco
49'ers brought suit against a California newspaper for distributing posters that
reproduced a photograph ofhimthat had previously appeared on the front page
of the paper."v The newspaper produced and sold the posters to the public for
five dollars each and gave them away at charity events. 128 Both the common
law and the statutory right of publicity exempt uses that report on matters of
public interest."z CitingPaulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., sthe courtruled
that the First Amendment protected the defendant's use because the posters
portrayed Montana in a role of public interest, thus making it newsworthy.'
Of all the varieties of expression protected by the First Amendment,
political speech is afforded the greatest constitutional protection. 32 The New
124. See Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 54 (noting general rule that newsworthy speech
receives First Amendment protection, whereas purely commercial speech usually does not).
125. See Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995) (noting that First Amendment protects even republishing of newsworthy photo-
graphs in newspapers).
126. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
127. See Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640 (Cal. Ct App. 1995) (stating background of
litigation). In Montana, the plaintiff, Joe Montana, appealed the decision of a lower court that
granted summary judgment for the defendant, San Jose Mercury News (SJMN). Id. at 640.
Montana alleged that SJMN violated his publicity rights by reproducing previously published
photographs and then selling them as posters to the public. Id. The lower court had asserted
that SDMN's use was privileged by the First Amendment's protection of speech. Id. The
California Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling, noting that both the common law
and statutory forms of publicity rights causes of action exempt uses that report on matters of
public interest. Id. at 643.
128. Id.
129. IM
130. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968)
131. See Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 639, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that First
Amendment protected newspaper's use of Montana's photograph on poster because it was
newsworthy); see also Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1968) (ruling that comedian's mock presidential election campaign was matter of public inter-
est). In Paulsen, a comedian engaged in a mock campaign for President of the United States
moved to enjoin Personality Posters, Inc. (Personality) from the continued printing and
marketing of posters containing an enlarged picture of him with the words "For President!'
overlaid on it Id.at 503. Though the plaintiff couched his action on the right of privacy, the
court correctly identified his complaint as arising from a publicity right Id. at 508. The court
denied Paulsen's claim, reasoning that the poster was speech advocating a political campaign,
albeit a mock campaign. Id. at 507-08. The use of Paulsen's image and identity were newswor-
thy and, therefore, entitled to full First Amendment protection. Id.
132. See Mayer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414,425 (1988) (stating that First Amendment proteco-
tion is greatest involving political speech); see also supra note 131 (discussing background of
Paulsen).
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York County Supreme Court adjudicated an early right of publicity case
involving overtones of political speech.' Paulsen v. Personality Posters,
Inc.' concerned the printing and marketing of posters urging support for
then-famous comedian, Pat Paulsen, for President of the United States in
1968.11 Although Paulsen alleged a violation of privacy rights, the court
correctly identified his case as an action for violation of Paulsen's publicity
rights. 3 6 The court weighed Paulsen's pecuniary interest against society's
interest in free expression and favored the latter's interest over Paulsen's
publicity rights, noting that it is not the court's role to "pass value judgments
predicated upon ephemeral subjective considerations which would serve to
stifle free expression."' 37
The courts have also settled the First Amendment issue regarding the use
of an individual's publicity right in the advertising context. The First Amend-
ment generally affords less protection to appropriations of identity or likeness
when they are used to further marketing efforts.13 In Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 39 Johnny Carson, the former host of The
Tonight Show, sued Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. for violating his
publicity rights. 4° Carson challenged the defendant's use of the words
"Here's Johnny" in the brand name oftheir portable toilet. 4 ' That phrase was
Carson's standard introduction by his Tonight Show sidekick Ed McMahon
and became forever linked in the public mind to Johnny Carson and his
television personality. 42 By misappropriating these words, Here's Johnny
Toilets, Inc. exploited part of Carson's identity for the sole purpose of market-
133. See generally Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct
1968) (adjudicating publicity rights case involving political speech).
134. 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1968).
135. See Paulsen, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 503-04 (stating background of case).
136. Id. at 508.
137. Id.
138. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 8:18 (noting that commercial speech receives lower
level of protection than political or social speech).
139. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983).
140. See Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 833 (6th Cir. 1983)
(summarizing Carson's claim against defendant). In Here's Johnny, the plaintiff asserted two
claims against the defendant for its use of the phrase "Here's Johnny" to market its portable
toilets. Id. at 832. First, Carson claimed that its use constituted unfair competition in violation
of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act Id. at 833. Second, Carson claimed that defendant's use of the
phrase violated his common law right of publicity. Id. at 834. The court held that the company
did not violate the Lanham Act in that it did not create the likelihood of customer confusion,
mistake, or deception. Id. at 833-34. The court did, however, find that Here's Johnny Portable
Toilets, Inc. violated Mr. Carson's publicity rights. Id. at 836.
141. Id. at 833.
142. Id. at 832.
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ing a product. 4 The court held that the defendant's use of the phrase in-
fringed on Mr. Carson's publicity rights, concluding that Carson's right of
publicity outweighed the protection due commercial speech.' Thus, pure
commercial speech, as that in Here's Johnny, receives less protection from
publicity rights claims than political or newsworthy speech. 4'
B. Unsettled Uses
In the right of publicity context, political and newsworthy speech gener-
ally receives greater protection than pure commercial speech." Such cases
rest on relatively settled principles and represent a mere fraction ofthe public-
ity rights suits litigated today. 47 What lies between political-newsworthy
speech and pure commercial speech remains unsettled, however. 41 Use of-the
phrase "Here's Johnny" to market portable toilets clearly violates Mr. Car-
son's publicity rights.' 49 Use of the same phrase in the text or the headline of
a newspaper article would certainly not be.'5 But what about a character in
a horror film who announces his presence by snarling, "Here's Johnny?'
5'
This uncertainty is largely a result of an inability to classify easily the
type of speech involved.' For example, the use on a greeting card of Judy
143. See id. at 836 (noting that defendant admittedly used Mr. Carson's identity for com-
mercial exploitation purposes).
144. See id. at 837 (vacating judgment of district court).
145. See supra Part IIlA (surveying degree of First Amendment protection afforded var-
ious types of uses).
146. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 8:18 (concluding that commercial speech enjoys
lesser position within First Amendment hierarchy); Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 54-55 (noting
that scholars, courts, and legislators accept that newsworthy speech is privileged by First
Amendment, while liability is reserved for commercial uses).
147. Cf Zimmerman, supra note 14, at 55-57 (discussing evolution of "newsworthy"
defense in right of publicity cases).
148. See Darren F. Farrington, Should theFirtAmendmentProtectAgainstRightofPub-
licitvInfiingementActions Where the Media Is Merchandiser? Say ItAin 'tSo, Joe, 7 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 779, 781 (1997) (noting that although many states have
codified publicity rights, "many remain unsettled"); Haemmerli, supra note 32, at 440 (question-
ing whether merchandise such as mugs and t-shirts constitute expression); Kwall, supra note 32,
at 47 (1994) (addressing conflict between right of publicity and First Amendment).
149. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text (discussing commercial appropriation
of publicity rights).
150. Cf supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text (discussing appropriation of celebrity
identity by newspaper).
151. See THE SHINING (Warner Bros. 1980) (quoting Johnny Carson's famous introduction
on "The Tonight Show").
152. See Haemmerli, supra note 32, at 441-43 (noting difficulty in categorizing merchan-
dise as commercial rather than as more protected form of expression).
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Garland's picture in a gay bar accompanied by her famous line, "Toto, I don't
think we're in Kansas anymore," was arguably a powerful means of self
expression in the gay community. 53 Was this use of Ms. Garland's image a
marketing ploy to sell a product, a contribution to public discourse, or both?
Although the First Amendment might not protect the appropriation of an
individual's identity to sell "mere merchandise," the question remains: Are
publicity rights violated when use of the persona also contains an element of
protected speech?
154
Many earlier right ofpublicity cases, while acknowledging free expression
concerns, concluded that mere merchandise relying heavily on a connection to
the celebrity was not protected by the First Amendment.'55 Gradually, how-
ever, First Amendment concerns weighed more heavily on the lower courts,
paralleling the growing breadth ofprotection afforded by modem First Amend-
ment jurisprudence.'56 Should this issue in the publicity rights context more
closely track the breadth and strength of protection afforded by general First
Amendment jurisprudence, the value of a celebrity's publicity rights likely will
continue to decline.
A case involving the marketing of parody baseball cards is a good exam-
ple of this trend.157 Parody as a form of expression generally receives full
First Amendment protection in right of publicity cases.'58 As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized in Cardtoons, L. C.
v. Major League Baseball Players Ass 'n, parody is a "form of social com-
mentary that dates to Greek antiquity" and has been an important medium of
153. See Madow, supra note 83, at 194-95 (1993) (discussing how gay men used Judy
Garland's image as means of self expression).
154. Cf Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689, 695 (1996) (discussing distinction
between "mere merchandise" and visual art).
155. See, e.g., Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426,430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (dis-
tinguishing books and movies from merchandise like bubble gum cards and posters, which
generally are not afforded constitutional protections); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,
449 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that commercial exploitation of plaintiff's
interests in merchandising products is not insulated by FirstAmendment); Rosemont Enters., Inc.
v. Urban Sys., Inc., 340 N.Y.S.2d 144,146 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (rejecting defendant's claim that
board game is as deserving of free speech protection as is biography, articles, or movie).
156. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F3d 959, 976 (10th
Cir. 1996) (ruling that First Amendment protected defendant's baseball cards); ETW Corp. v.
Jireh Publ'g Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 835 (N.D. Ohio 2000), appeal docketed, No. 00-3584
(6th Cir. 2001) (ruling that FirstAmendment protects prints made of Tiger Woods painting).
157. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969, 972-76 (finding that FirstAmendment protects Card-
toons' trading cards due to court's determination that society's interest in card's informational
and social commentary value is greater than pecuniary interest of baseball players).
158. Cf id. at 972 (noting that parody is protected form of expression partly due to its
value as social criticism and commentary). But see Samsung, 971 F.2d at 1401-02 (ruling that
parody as form of commercial speech is not protected by First Amendment).
159. 95 F3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996).
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"political debate throughout our nation's history."'" In Cardtoons, the Tenth
Circuit considered an appeal by the Major League Baseball Players Associa-
tion (MLBPA) from a judgment for Cardtoons, L.C. (Cardtoons), an Okla-
homa company wishing to market parody trading cards that lampooned the
least admirable traits of professional baseball players." MLBPA contended
that Cardtoons violated the publicity rights of its members and was not
protected from liability by the First Amendment's freedom of expression. 62
They argued that the defendant's product was merely merchandise and that
sufficient alternative channels existed for the defendant's message. 6 The
court disagreed, ruling that the detrimental effects of suppressing social
commentary and criticism outweighed the publicity rights of the MLBPA.16
While acknowledging that the invasion of the right of publicity presented
some level of harm to the MLBPA, the court applied a balancing test to the
two competing interests and concluded that society's interest in free expres-
sion outweighed the MLBPA's publicity rights."
IV Reconciliation of the Conflict
Courts and commentators continue to search for a more satisfactory
resolution to the conflict between the First Amendment and publicity rights.166
160. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 969 (discussing value and importance of parody to social, polit-
ical, and public commentary and criticism). Cardtoons involved an attempt by an Oklahoma
company to market parody baseball trading cards without license or permission of the player
depicted. Id. In response to a cease and desist order filed by the Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA), Cardtoons brought an action to obtain declaratory judgment that the
parody trading cards did not infringe on the publicity rights of the MLBPA's members. Id The
district court ruled that these trading cards did enjoy First Amendment protection, establishing
a parody exception to Oklahoma's right of publicity statute. Id. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals considered MLBPA's argument that Cardtoons did not have a First Amend-
ment right to market its trading cards without permission. Id. The court evaluated the claim
using a three-part framework. Id. at 966. First, the court found that Cardtoons infringed on
MLBPA's right of publicity. Id. at 968. Second, the court determined that the parody trading
cards deserved some level of First Amendment protection. Id. at 970. Finally, the court
weighed the legitimate publicity rights of the MLBPA against the First Amendment rights of
Cardtoons. Id. at 970-76. Specifically, the court attempted to balance the "magnitude of the
speech restriction" against the asserted governmental interest in protecting the intellectual prop-
erty right. Id. at 972. The court concluded that the justifications for the right of publicity did
not justify the loss of the entertainment and social commentary provided by the parody trading
cards and thus affrmed the district court's decision. Id. at 976.
161. Id. at 962.
162. See id. (ruling in favor ofdefendant, Cardtoons, L.C.).
163. See id. at 969, 971 (arguing that First Amendment did not protect defendant's parody
baseball cards).
164. Id. at976.
165. Id at 970-76.
166. See generally Haemmerli, supra note 32 (discussing merits of various proposals to
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While some continue to advocate an expansive vision of the right of pub-
licity,167 a post-modernist trend toward minimizing the scope and efficacy of
the right of publicity has developed." Other commentators continue the
search for a compromise between protecting publicity rights and society's
First Amendment interests.' 69  This section discusses the most commonly
posited attempts at reconciling these opposing interests and notes their inher-
ent deficiencies, emphasizing the need for an alternative approach.
170
A. Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine
Copyright's fair use doctrine is perhaps one of the most commonly
advanced frameworks for accommodating First Amendment concerns.171 This
is not surprising, as copyright and the right of publicity have much in com-
mon.172 Both seek to preserve the owner's incentive to create by preventing
unauthorized appropriation of intellectual property rights.' 73 Thus, scholars
have attempted to borrow copyright's fair use doctrine to resolve the First
Amendment dilemma."74 The Copyright Act, which codifies the fair use
resolve First Amendment/right of publicity conflict, arguing instead for "Kantian Right of
Publicity"); Kwall, supra note 32 (criticizing post-modernist approaches to First Amendment
conflict and advocating liability and property rule framework); Zimmerman, supra note 14
(arguing that publicity rights doctrine has failed to track First Amendment jurisprudence and
that publicity rights should be considered subordinate to all expression, including commercial
speech).
167. See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 46 (defining extensive publicity rights doc-
trine).
168. See generaliy Zimmerman, supra note 14 (questioning justifications for publicity
rights doctrine).
169. See generally Kwall, supra note 32 (proposing liability approach to First Amendment
concerns).
170. See infra notes 171-94 and accompanying text (discussing common attempts to recon-
cile publicity rights with First Amendment).
171. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 57 (noting popularity of copyright's fair use doctrine to
analyze publicity rights/First Amendment conflict).
172. See id. at 59 (noting that copyright and publicity rights are analogous).
173. See id. (stating that both doctrines provide incentives for individuals to devote them-
selves to creative activities).
174. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 8:38 (citing Richard C. Ausness, The Right of
Publicit: A "Haystack in a Huricane, " 55 TEP L.Q. 977,1048 (1982) (suggesting usefulness
of fair use doctrine in measuring First Amendment values); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Is
Independence Day Dawningfor the Right ofPublicly?, 17 U.C. DAVIs L.REV. 191,232 (1983)
(advocating fair use doctrine as appropriate mechanism to balance competing interests of
publicity rights and First Amendment); Pamela Samuelson, Reviving Zaechini: Analing First
Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and Copyright Cases, 57 TUL. L. REV. 836, 915
(1983) (proposing modified version of fair use doctrine to accommodate First Amendment
values)).
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doctrine, accommodates First Amendment principles by considering the fol-
lowing four primary factors: "(1) the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.""' With these factors in mind, the fair use doctrine
mediates the balance between compensated and uncompensated access to
works protected by the act.
176
An important difference between the rationale for copyright and that of
publicity rights, which argues against application of the fair use doctrine,
centers on its fourth factor - the effect on marketability. Although the right
of publicity is concerned with dilution of the persona's commercial value, itsmain rationale is to prevent the unjust enrichment of the appropriator.177 As
argued below, the unjust enrichment doctrine provides not only the primary
rationale for the existence of publicity rights (as elucidated in Zacchin), but
also the key to a more satisfactory resolution of its conflict with the First
Amendment. 17
B. Classification of Use Systems
Many analyses rely on classification systems that delineate the depth of
First Amendment protection afforded to publicity rights appropriations.179
One authority's analysis begins with a categorization of the use as either an
informational, entertainment, or commercial use. 8' This approach advocates
varying treatment based on the type of use, with commercial uses receiving
the lowest level of protection.8 Such a framework is, at first, attractive due
to its seeming simplicity.182 However, it is less helpful in application because
175. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994).
176. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 57 (discussing mechanics of fair use doctrine).
177. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,576 (1977) ("The rationale
for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straight-forward one of preventing unjust enrichment
by the theft of good will.").
178. See infra Part IV.E (proposing restitutionary remedy to accommodate First Amend-
ment concerns in conjunction with right of publicity).
179. See Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of
RealPeople by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1602 (1979) (classifying uses as informational,
entertainment, or commercial).
180. See id. at 1597 (delineating three purposes of media's portrayal of individuals).
181. See id. at 1599 (stating that commercial uses of another's publicity right receive little
First Amendment protection).
182. Cf Kwall, supra note 32, at 56 (asserting that categorization of uses, while useful as
starting point, must be developed more thoroughly).
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it is often too difficult to categorize publicity uses.' Merchandise, such as
Cardtoon's parody baseball cards, conceivably could be classified as a com-
mercial, informational, or entertainment use." 4 As discussed above, parody
contains elements of social commentary as well as entertainment.' In
addition, baseball cards typically contain information about the players,
including statistics and other vital information." 6 There is no doubt that
baseball cards are primarily a commercial enterprise as well."s The inability
to classify the use neatly into one of these three distinct categories renders
such a system unworkable and is largely unhelpful.
C. Balancing Tests
More recently, the California Supreme Court attempted to relieve the
tension between the First Amendment and the right of publicity in Comedy 1II
Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.' by applying a balancing test. 9 In
Comedy II, the court formulated a test based on whether the infringing use
added sufficient creative elements to the image of the celebrity to transform
it into something more than a mere imitation or literal likeness of the sub-
ject.1"e The court reasoned that mere "depictions of celebrities amounting to
little more than the appropriation of the celebrity's economic value are not
protected expression under the First Amendment."'' The court distinguished
between defendant Saderup's literal depiction ofthe "Three Stooges" and Andy
Warhol's transformative depictions of Marilyn Monroe and others."9
While few would have difficulty distinguishing between a Saderup and
a Warhol, "should constitutional protection turn on a judge's view as to
183. See id. (noting difficulty of assigning appropriated uses to particular categories).
184. Cf. Kwall, supra note 32, at 56-57 (questioning whether baseball version of Trivial
Pursuit should be classified as informative, commercial, or entertainment use).
185. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 969 (10th
Cir. 1996) (noting that cards are no less protected because they consist of humorous, rather than
serious, commentary).
186. See id. (noting that trading cards have been important medium for dissemination of
information for more than 100 years).
187. See id. at 970 (asserting that use in form of commercial merchandise is irrelevant in
First Amendment analysis).
188. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
189. See Comedy HI Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 (Cal. 2001)
(applying test that examines degree to which use transforms celebrity's identity in use). For
background of underlying dispute, see supra note 17.
190. Comedy III Prods., 21 P.3d at 799.
191. Id. at 805.
192. See id. at 811 (noting that unlike Warhol's paintings, Saderup's depiction lacked any
"significant transformative or creative contribution").
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whether a work of art is simple-minded and imitative, or instead conveys
ironic social comment?"193 As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes warned, "It
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only in the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations,
outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits. '194 Such an approach is
unsatisfactory because it conditions constitutional protection upon the subjec-
tive considerations of one person.
D. A New Direction
Conventional approaches to reconciling the First Amendment with pub-
licity rights present two fundamental problems. 95 First, they attempt to
characterize or categorize the protected speech by its use to determine whether
a First Amendment infringement exists, which results in crude and often
contradictory results.196 Second, they compound the problem by applying
inflexible and inappropriate remedies to these rather imprecise determinations
of liability, resulting in unjust and unpredictable outcomes." Reconciliation
of the First Amendment/publicity rights conflict requires a compromise that
addresses each of these issues.
1. Comparative Negligence Analogy
Conventional approaches to this conflict are unsatisfactory because they
impose all or nothing liability for appropriations of identity that contain an
element of protectable speech. As discussed above, infringing uses of an
individual's publicity rights often contain an arguable element of expres-
sion.'98 Barring a publicity rights cause of action completely in a use that
contains a very limited speech element combined with a substantial appropria-
tion of identity is akin to barring recovery of a minimally negligent driver for
the gross negligence of another.
Such a result occurred in a Minnesota case involving two partially negli-
gent drivers who collided at an unmarked intersection.199 In Haeg v. Sprague,
193. Lewis R. Clayton, Judges as Critics, NAT'L LI., July 16,2001, atA23.
194. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239,251-52 (1903).
195. See supra Parts IVA-C (noting inadequacies of conventional frameworks).
196. See supra Parts IVJ3-C (employing subjective test to determine extent ofFirst Amend-
ment protection).
197. See infra Part IV.D.2 (reasoning that fair market value measure of damages chills
expression because of uncertainty regarding whether use is infringing coupled with possibility
that fair market value of damages might exceed profits).
198. See supra Parts Ill.A-B (surveying right of publicity cases that address First Amend-
ment issues).
199. See Haeg v. Sprague, Warner & Co., 281 N.W. 261,262-63 (Minn. 1938) (holding
that state's contributory negligence regime barred plaintiff's recovery).
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Warner & Co.,2 ° the Minnesota Supreme Court reluctantly barred any recov-
ery by the plaintiff for an accident in which the defendant was the major
cause. 1 Noting that 'the rule of comparative negligence would serve justice
more faithfully than that of contributory negligence," the court felt compelled
to enforce the law as it was, rather than as it should have been, and thus,
applied the contributory negligence doctrine.2" The result, the court implied,
was unfair.20 3 Why should a tortfeasor be barred from recovery in an auto
accident in which the defendant is 90 percent at fault and the victim only 10
percent responsible? Similarly, why should a merchandiser be able to capital-
ize on the wholesale appropriation of a celebrity's identity by inserting a
minimal element of protected expression?2'
A better approach would follow the lead of the comparative negligence
doctrine. In response to the inequitable outcomes that resulted from the appli-
cation of the contributory negligence regime, nearly every state adopted some
form of the comparative negligence doctrine, which apportions liability based
on the negligence of each party in the accident.0 5 Applying this framework,
a plaintiff found partially negligent in causing the accident collects only for the
defendant's portion of fault.2' Likewise, a defendant who is overwhelmingly
responsible for the plaintiff's injuries does not completely escape liability.2"
Nor is a defendant completely liable for those injuries that were partially the
result of the plaintiff's own negligence.2"s As a law student and future Presi-
dent put it, "[C]omparative negligence statutes at least provide amore rational
approach to the problem than the crude doctrines of the common law.""
200. 281 N.W. 261 (imin. 1938).
201. Haeg, 281 N.W. at 263 (ruling that plaintiffwas barred from recovery by Minnesota's
contributory negligence law). In Haeg, plaintiff and defendant collided at an intersection in rural
Minnesota. Id. at 261. Despite the clear evidence of defendant's negligence, the court found that
the plaintiff was negligent for not recognizing and preventing the imminent collision, although
he had the right of way. Id. at 263. Thus, the court found that both parties' negligence caused
the accident Id. at 262-63. Recognizing that Minnesota had adopted a contributory, not
comparative negligence regime, the court reluctantly barred recovery by the plaintiff. Id. at 263.
202. See id. (ruling reluctantly for defendant).
203. See id. (noting that comparative negligence rule would better serve justice than con.
tributory negligence rule).
204. Cf Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (concluding that intent to evade
restriction on commercial leafleting by inserting protest against official conduct was insufficient
to justify First Amendment protection).
205. VICTORE. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLGENCE § 1-1, at 2-4 (3d ed. 1994) (sur-
veying American jurisdiction's adoption of comparative negligence doctrine).
206. See id. § 3.2, at 58-60 (defining pure comparative negligence regime).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Richard Nixon, Note, ChangingRules ofLiability inAutomobileAccidentLitigaion,
3 LAW & CON'Ev. PROBS. 476,483 (1936).
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The comparative negligence analogy can be applied to the publicity
rights/First Amendment conflict to produce a more satisfactory result."' 0 In
a comparative system, a user would be liable for the appropriation of the
celebrity's identity but not for the expressive element of the use. This ap-
proach addresses the concerns expressed in Cardtoons, in which the. court
faced the task of weighing the harms to society by choosing either complete
liability or none at all.2" In Cardtoons, the court recognized that neither
choice was completely satisfactory.212 On one hand, the court noted the
incentive that protecting publicity rights has on creative output by the cel-
ebrity.2" 3 On the other hand, the court recognized that imposing liability
would harm society by limiting a speaker's access to a full and rich public
domain.214 Furthermore, the court noted that imposing liability on Cardtoons
would, in effect, unjustly enrich the baseball players in that they would
receive profits that were partly attributable to the appeal of Cardtoon's skillful
parody.
215
2. Professor Kwall's Approach
Professor Roberta Rosenthal Kwall proposed a step in the right direction
in her article, The Right ofPublicity vs. the FirstAmendment: A Property and
Liability Rule Analysis. 2 6 In her thorough and somewhat complex analysis,
Kwall compares the societal harms presented by allowing the unauthorized
use of publicity rights with the benefits that society derives from that use.
217
To that end, Kwall examines a number of factors in order to determine the
proper disposition of a case, including (1) economic harms to the plaintiff,
(2) moral harms to the plaintiff; (3) likelihood of consumer deception,
(4) decreased incentives for the plaintiff, (5) harms to relatives of plaintiff,
(6) likelihood of unjust enrichment, and (7) type ofuse.218 Most importantly,
she recognizes the significance of the choice of remedy in accommodating the
210. See infra Part V (applying comparative approach to ETW).
211. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 970-76
(1996) (weighing free speech interests against publicity rights interests); see also supra notes
157-65 and accompanying text (discussing Cardtoons).
212. See id. (finding justifications for publicity rights and expression in form of parody).
213. Id. at 974.
214. Id. at 972.
215. Id. at 976.
216. See generally Kwall, supra note 32 (proposing liability analysis to certain types of
publicity rights violations where First Amendment issue exists).
217. Id. at49.
218. See id. at 117-18 (proposing framework for resolving First Amendment/publicity
rights conflict in matrix form).
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competing interests of free expression and publicity rights." 9 She correctly
recognizes that injunctive relief, as the most obvious form of prior restraint,
is an extreme remedy to a publicity rights claim that contains an element of
expression.Y2 Instead, she supports a liability rule approach that imposes
damages equal to the fair market value of a license to use the celebrity's
identity.22u
Her framework, nevertheless, suffers from some of the same limitations
from which conventional attempts to reconcile these conflicting interests also
suffer.' Kwall's analysis fails to confront fully the chilling effect that in-
posing even a fair market value liability on the appropriator might have on the
output of expression.' She would merely have the court consider whether
the appropriator would forgo the use if faced with a mandatory damage award
based on fair market value. 4 For example, one can easily imagine an unes-
tablished artist refraining from painting a celebrity who commands an exorbi-
tant licensing fee in the marketplace because the fair market value of a license
to use that identity would likely be substantially higher than the most optimis-
tic forecast ofprofits. In this situation, Kwall would give the court discretion
as to whether or not to impose damages; the court would consider whether the
artist would likely forgo the creative endeavor if forced to pay the fair market
value of the plaintiffs persona.' However, not knowing how the court
would decide this issue, the artist likely would prefer to avoid the risk of
mandatory damages and the cost of litigation. Thus, Kwall's liability-rule
framework, although a step in the right direction, fails to alleviate concerns
that in some instances publicity rights chill free expression.
E. Proposal
A fair market valuation fails because it focuses on the pecuniary loss of
the celebrity, rather than on the gain to the appropriator. As the Court in Zac-
chini stated, "ft]he rationale for protecting the right ofpublicity is the straight-
219. See id. at 50-52 (recognizing that choice of remedy may more satisfactorily resolve
conflict between publicity rights and First Amendment).
220. See id. at 64-65 (recognizing that prior restraints on speech like injunctive relief are
particularly offensive to First Amendment values).
221. See id. at 103-04 (suggesting imposition of damage award in form of fair market value
for certain cases of publicity rights infringement).
222. See generally id. (proposing framework that relies on classification of speech).
223. See id. at 103-04 (requiring only that court consider whether or not fair market valua-
tion of damages would act as disincentive to creative output).
224. Id.
225. See id. (proposing that court weigh whether defendant would forgo creative use if
forced to pay fair market value of plaintiffs persona).
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forward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will.' By
focusing on the realized gain from the appropriation, rather than on the fair
market value of what is appropriated, a court can separate more precisely the
speech element from the appropriation element. Thus, the determination of
the appropriator's gain, rather than the celebrity's loss, might provide a more
appropriate remedial measure.
Although three of the fourteen states that have publicity rights statutes
authorize the recovery of an infringer's profits," few cases have considered
this option.' Support for this approach does appear in the academic litera-
ture, however 30 Comments c and d of the Restatment (Third) of Unfair
Competition suggest that proportional profit remedies are available to a court
for publicity rights infingement.3 1 Comment d states that a "plaintiff may
recover the proportion of the defendant's net profits that is attributable to the
unauthorized use."
2
This Note proposes the use of an "accounting for profits" form of restitu-
tion to accommodate First Amendment concerns in right of publicity cases. 3
Accounting for profits is a form of restitutionary relief24 that evolved from
the common law action of account." s Chancery was justified in compelling
226. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,576 (1977).
227. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 11:34 (noting justifications for implementation of
profits-based remedy).
228. See HANOCHDAGANUNJUSTENRICHMENT: A STUDYOFPRIVATE LAWANDU BLC
VALUES 94 (1997) (noting limited availability of profits-based remedy) (citing MCCARTHY,
supra note 46, § 6.2-6.15).
229. See Factors Etc. Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 652 F.2d 278 (2d Cir. 1981) (granting damages to extent of profits
derived by defendants from unauthorized use of Elvis's identity); Price v. Hal Roach Studios,
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying relief because Now York law only
permits accounting of profits when plaintiff and defendant exist in fiduciary relationship);
Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,452 (Cal. 1979) (Bird, CJ., dissenting) (stating that
court should hold defendant liable for profits attributable to misappropriation of identity).
230. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49(1) (1995) (asserting that
"[o]ne who is liable for an appropriation of the commercial value of another's identity ... is
liable for the pecuniary loss ... or for the actor's own pecuniary gain resulting from the appro-
priation, whichever is greater, unless such relief... is otherwise inappropriate"); DAGAN, supra
note 228, at 94 (noting grounds for profit-based remedy found in literature).
231. SeeREBrATEMENT(THiRD)OFUNFAIRCOMPETITION §49cmts c-d (1995) (suggesting
that accounting of defendant's profits is available to court in appropriate situations).
232. Id. § 49 cat d.
233. See infra Part IV.E (proposing use of accounting for profits form of restitution to
reconcile tension between First Amendment and right of publicity).
234. See DAND. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDmS § 4.3(5), at 608 (2d ed. 1993).
235. See id. § 4.3(5), at 608-09 (tracing evolution of accounting for profits remedy).
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an accounting when the special abilities of masters were required to sort out
complex details that were too difficult for a lay jury."' Chancery was also
justified to compel an accounting when a duty of trust existed between the
defendant and the plaintiff. 7 Today, it is clear that an accounting for profits
is available in non-fiduciary cases." Copyright and trademark law specifi-
cally authorize profit recoveries without the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship between the infringer and the rightful owner. 9 Support for this approach
also appears in the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.240
The Restatement asserts that the appropriate method of measuring relief
for a publicity right violation depends upon an appraisal of the case's particu-
lar facts. 241 In general, the Restatement authorizes recovery of either the
plaintiff's loss or the defendant's gain from the use, whichever is greater, for
a publicity rights infringement. 42 It warns, however, that when the plaintiff's
loss is less than the defendant's gain, an accounting for profits can result in
a windfall to the plaintiff and, therefore, may not be appropriate in the case
of an innocent infringer.243 Professor Dagan is even more cautious, asserting
that a profit based recovery is only appropriate when the defendant's use
degrades the commercial value of the publicity rights. 44 Even Professor
Dobbs suggests that such a remedy is appropriate only when the merits of the
case justify "an extreme remedy. 245 As Professor Dagan posits, a measure of
recovery based on profits seeks to vindicate the plaintiff's liberty and
control.
246
236. See id. at 609 (explaining that need for masters of Chancery to make sense of complex
accounting details justified equity jurisdiction).
237. See id. at 610-11 (noting that equity traditionally took jurisdiction in accounting of
fiduciaries due to fiduciary's duty to account).
238. See id. at 611-12 (citing examples of situations when accounting for profits is
appropriate though no fiduciary relationship exists).
239. See id. at 611 (noting existence of statutes authorizing accounting for profits in
copyright and trademark cases).
240. RESTATEmENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 49(2) (1995) (asserting that profit
recovery is appropriate remedy for right of publicity infingement).
241. Id.
242. Id. § 49(1).
243. Id. § 49 cmt. c.
244. See DAGAN, supra note 228, at 96 (delineating situations when profit-based recovery
is appropriate).
245. DOBBS, supra note234, § 4.3(5), at 612 (asserting that non-fiduciaries may berequired
to relinquish their profits in some cases when merits justify such extreme remedy).
246. See DAGAN, supra note 228, at 18 (concluding that profits as measure of recovery
vindicates plaintiff's liberty to control entitlement).
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This Note proposes an accounting of profits form of restitution as a lim-
iting mechanism on recovery.247 As discussed, the imposition of damages mea-
sured by fair market value is inappropriate in cases when an identity's use also
contains protected forms of expression because such a remedy potentially
chills free speech.24 Although its aim is merely compensatory, fair market
valuation is too imprecise to accomplish this goal in every situation.249 Rather,
the imposition of the lesser of fair market value and proportional profits is a
more appropriate approach in right of publicity cases when the First Amend-
ment is implicated. A proportional profits regime allows the plaintiff to
recover profits attributable to the plaintiff's appeal." Thus, when the fair
market value of the celebrity's publicity right is greater than the profits at-
tributable to its use, the proportional profit remedy merely will hold the defen-
dant accountable for profits earned from the appropriation. 1 Profits attribut-
able to the defendant's contribution remain intact for the defendant. 2
This proposal involves the following four-step analysis in order to deter-
mine the appropriate relief for a publicity rights infringement: (1) Is the appro-
priation predominantly informational/newsworthy (completely protected) or
does it merely advertise a product (entitled to any form of relief, including
injunction)? 3 (2) Does the appropriation diminish the identity's commercial
value? 4 (3) Is there a legitimate First Amendment issue?. (4) To what
extent are profits derived from the good will ofthe appropriated identity? 6
1. Type of Use
As discussed above, two categories of publicity rights appropriations are
well settled. 7 The First Amendment provides complete protection where the
247. See infra Part IV.E (proposing restitutionary scheme aimed at accommodating First
Amendment values).
248. See supra notes 222-25 and accompanying text (arguing that fair-market-value-based
remedy potentially chills free expression).
249. See supra Section IV.D.2 (illustrating chilling effect that fair market valuation might
have on speech).
250. Cf McCARTHY, supra note 46, § 11:34 (noting similar regime in analogous copyright
and trademark cases).
251. Cf. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 801-02
(apportioning profits attributable to infringed song to plaintiff in copyright case).
252. Cf id. (apportioning profits attributable to defendant's contribution to defendant).
253. See discussion infra Part V.E.1.
254. See discussion infra Part IVE.2.
255. See discussion infra Part IV.E.3.
256. See discussion infra Part IV.E.4.
257. See supra Part III (recognizing that pure informational uses of another's identity receive
blanket First Amendment protection while pure commercial uses receive none).
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use of a celebrity's identity is informational or newsworthy."8 Examples of
such uses include documentaries, newspaper articles, and biographies." 9
Such uses are entitled to full First Amendment protection and are therefore
not subject to recovery.2e°
On the other hand, if the use is purely commercial - that is, purely for
advertising purposes - the First Amendment provides no shelter to the appro-
priation.261 Unauthorized use of a celebrity's name or likeness in a print
advertisement or television commercial falls in this category.262 So long as an
award is not duplicative, the plaintiff would be entitled to an injunction, resti-
tution, and/or damages at law because the First Amendment does not protect
such uses.263 If the appropriation falls into neither of these categories, the
analysis proceeds to step two.
2. Commercial Value Diminution
Should the plaintiff be able to prove that the defendant's use diminishes
the commercial value of the plaintiff's identity, then the full panoply of
remedies afforded in commercial misappropriation cases should apply.2 The
First Amendment should not protect those who not only misappropriate the
identity of another, but who also thereby diminish the commercial value ofthe
plaintiffs persona. 26 Using a celebrity's identity to express a controversial
idea, for example, might diminish the value of that use. In such a case, the
plaintiff should be able to enjoin such a use and recover damages and/or
profits. Take, for example, the Garland example discussed in Part III.B.2as
258. See McCARTTHY, supra note 46, § 8:90 (stating that "[t]he unpermitted use of human
identity which bears a reasonable relationship to "news" is constitutionally immune from lia-
biity ... from infringement of the right of publicity").
259. See RESTAEM4ENr (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt c (1995) (noting that
newsworthy exception applies to newspapers, magazines, print, and broadcast biographies,
among others).
260. See id. (stating that informational uses are generally not actionable).
261. See id. § 47 cmt. a (1995) (stating that unauthorized use of another's name or likeness
for advertising purposes will ordinarily subject user to liability for infringement of other's right
of publicity).
262. Id.
263. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 11:34 (asserting that profits as measure of recovery
is appropriate so long as there is no double recovery).
264. See general~yRESTATEMENT CDIM)OFUNFAIRCOMPETr1ON §§ 48-49(1995) (sur-
veying remedies available in commercial misappropriation of identity cases).
265. See Kwall, supra note 32, at 117 (illustrating plaintiff's entitlement to injunctive relief
for defendant's hybrid uses that contain moral and economic harm to plaintiff).
266. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (using Judy Garland greeting card
example to highlight difficulty in categorizing uses of identity).
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The gay community's use of Judy Garland's image was arguably a powerful
vehicle for self-expression. 6 Were Ms. Garland aware of this use, however,
she may have vehemently objected to such use because homosexuality was
much less accepted fifty years ago than it is today. She probably could have
persuasively argued that associating her name with the gay community greatly
diminished the value of her persona, in that many moviemakers and advertis-
ers were hesitant to associate their product with a controversial lifestyle. 68
When diminution of the persona's commercial value can be shown, the plain-
tiff should have access to injunctive relief as well as some measure of dam-
ages or restitution. When the plaintiff is unable to show diminution of the
persona' commercial value, the analysis proceeds to step three.
3. FirstAmendment Defense
Once the plaintiff establishes that the defendant has appropriated the
celebrity's identity outside of a purely commercial or newsworthy use, the
burden would shift to the defendant to show that the use implicates the First
Amendment's protection of expression. Although the First Amendment ques-
tion is similar to that posed in traditional publicity rights/First Amendment
analysis, it differs in an important way. In this analysis, the defendant's
ability to demonstrate some level of First Amendment protection determines
the type of relief granted, rather than whether any relief is granted at all. If the
defendant is unable to establish a threshold First Amendment showing, the
plaintiff is entitled to the full panoply of relief, which includes injunctive
relief, damages, and restitution. However, if the defendant is able to establish
a First Amendment issue, the plaintiff is limited to restitution in the form of
an accounting for profits. It should be noted here that the defendant's burden
differs from that under traditional analysis. Under contemporary jurispru-
dence, once a court recognizes a First Amendment issue, it weighs society's
interest in protecting this use against society's interest in preserving the
plaintiff's commercial interest in identity.269 Under this Note's proposal, once
the defendant has established some minimal level of protected expression, the
analysis proceeds to a remedy stage.
267. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing use of Judy Garland's identity
as means of self-expression by gay community in 1950s).
268. Contra Madow, supra note 83, at 195 (noting that Garland's publicity value likely
increased after gay community's use of her image). It is far from clear, however, that Ms.
Garland's publicity value would have increased had the gay community's use occurred in the
1940s rather than in the 1980s.
269. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 8:22 (explaining traditional balancing test employed
by courts).
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For example, once the plaintiff in Cardtoons established that Cardtoons,
L.C. had appropriated the ballplayers' identities, Cardtoons would be required
to raise a First Amendment defense." Cardtoons easily could meet this
requirement by showing the informational and parodic expression present in
their baseball cards." Rather than attempting to weigh societal interests, the
court, upon a First Amendment showing, would proceed to step four to
determine the amount of restitution to which the plaintiff was entitled.
4. Restitution
The careful formulation of step four is critical to this proposal's success
because this analysis proposes the restitutionary remedy of accounting for
profits as the mechanism for resolving the conflict between the right of
publicity and the First Amendment. As discussed above, First Amendment
advocates are acutely concerned with the right of publicity's propensity to
chill expression. 2 This Note proposes an alternative to both the all or nothing
approach currently employed by United States courts and the fair market value
approach favored by Professor Kwall and others." If a proportional profits
rule is to succeed, however, it must be implemented so that it reaches only
those profits attributable to the appropriation ofthe plaintiff's publicity rights.
Allowing the plaintiff to recover any more would restrict the expressive
component of the defendant's use, which approximates the chilling effect that
fair market value damages pose to free expression."
Initially, the plaintiff would bear the burden of showing gross receipts
from the use at issue.2" The plaintiff would derive this figure from discov-
ery.276 Once the court has made a finding of fact as to gross receipts, the focus
turns to net profits.27 7 To arrive at this figure, the burden shifts to the defen-
dant to show the legitimate business expenses that the court should deduct
270. For a general discussion of the issues raised in Cardtoons, see supra notes 156-60.
271. See supra note 159-60 (noting Cardtoon's use of parody).
272. See MCCARTHY, supra note 46, § 8:9 (noting chilling effect publicity rights have on
expression).
273. Compare supra Part IV.E (proposing alternative approach based on restitution) with
supra Parts IVA-C, IV.D.2 (discussing other approaches).
274. Cf United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995)
(expressing concern that ban on honoraria would chill speech by taking away incentive to
convey information to public).
275. See DoBBSsupra note 234, § 4.3(5), at 612 n.27 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1994))
(noting that plaintiff need only prove defendant's sales).
276. See id. at 610 (noting that placement of burden to produce data regarding gross
revenue is not needed with advent of extensive modem discovery).
277. See id. at 612 (discussing how courts determine profits).
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from gross receipts in order to arrive at a net profit determination."' This
shift in burden to the defendant is appropriate because the defendant has the
best access to expense information. 9 Next, the court would have to appor-
tion the net profits between that which can be attributed to the misappropria-
tion of publicity rights and those resulting from the appeal of the defendant's
creativity and skill.28
For example, the maker of parody baseball cards, Cardtoons, would be
required to show legitimate business expenses attributable to the production
of its product.8 1 Costs may include the salary of the artists and writers who
parodied the baseball players, the price of raw materials such as cardboard and
ink, and marketing and shipping costs.8 2 Once this total is subtracted from
the gross receipts of the product's sales, the task of the court would be to
apportion the profits.2 3 As is the case in copyright and trademark, it may be
impossible to determine precisely the portion of profits attributable to each
party.2 4 That is not to say that this task is merely guesswork. Certainly, the
appeal of an Elvis poster with the defendant-created caption "In Memory" is
due far more to Elvis's identity than to the marketer's caption."8 The burden
remains on the defendant to show the extent to which net profits are due to the
defendant's contribution.
As Professor Dobbs points out, precise apportionment may be diffi-
cult.se However, the fact that part of the profits result from protected activity
278. See id. (asserting that burden should rest with defendant to show appropriate business
expenses to deduct from gross receipts and noting that burden is placed this way in copyright
and trademark cases).
279. See id. (justifying shift of burden to defendant to show deductible expenses). What
should be included in legitimate business expenses is largely an accounting measure issue that
is beyond the scope of this Note. However, case law on this subject undoubtedly exists and can
be applied to this measurement See, e.g., infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing legitimate business expense deductions).
280. Cf. ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 801-02
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (apportioning profits based on relative contributions and appeal of parties in
copyright infringement case).
281. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th
Cir. 1996) (recognizing Cartoon's creative and financial expenditures in producing trading
cards); supra note 160 (discussing background of case).
282. See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 976 (noting Cardtoon's various expenditures).
283. Cf. ABKO Music, 508 F. Supp. at 801 (denying deductions for otherwise legitimate
expenses due to defendant's inability to specify those attributable solely to infringing song).
284. See DOBBS, supra note 234, § 4.5(3), at 642 (noting that precise apportionment may
be difficult).
285. See generally Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
286. See DOBBS, supra note 235, § 4.5(3), at 642 ("A song that infringes the plaintiff's
copyrighted melody may sell well partly because the melody is attractive but also because the
infringer's lyrics are better.").
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should not bar any recovery at all. Certainly, some profits garnered by the
defendant due to publicity rights infiingement are attributable to protected
activity and expenses. Additionally, some of the profits are due to exploita-
tion of the celebrity's appeal. That a jury cannot precisely apportion the
exact contribution of negligence due to each driver in an auto accident should
not bar any recovery by the less negligent victim." Similarly, uncertainty
should not bar recovery in the publicity rights context. 8 It is entirely con-
ceivable that an unknown artist would forgo protected expressive activity if
it was unclear that the venture would net enough in profits to cover damages
equal to the fair market valuation of the appropriated identity.ss Under this
approach, the most the artist would lose would be net profits. Furthermore,
this possibility exists only in the unlikely instance where an appropriator
contributes absolutely nothing to the appeal of the infringing product. Thus,
where the court can determine the approximate portion of net profits attribut-
able to each party, "want of precision is not a ground for denying apportion-
ment altogether."
29
Guidance to apportionment is provided by copyright case law, as it
employs a similar regime. 1 In Gaste v. Kaiserman, 2 for example, the court
affirmed the lower court's ruling, which held that the composer and publisher
of the song Feelings infringed on the plaintiff's song, Pour Toi. 9 To deter-
287. See supra Part IV.D.1 (discussing inequities of contributory negligence regimes).
288. It is important to differentiate the imprecision that may result from using a fair market
valuation of damages from the imprecision in apportioning net profits between the plaintiff and
the defendant Using a fair market valuation of damages for a publicity rights infringement
rather than actual attributable profits is imprecise; it ignores the relative contributions to the
success of the infringing venture.
289. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text (illustrating chilling effect that fair
market valuation may have, on free expression).
290. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1070 (2d Cir. 1988).
291. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 801-02
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that while exact precision is not possible, one quarter of infringing
song's profits were due to defendant's lyrics and popularity with consumers).
292. 863 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1988).
293. Gaste v. Kaisermnn, 863 F.2d 1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming lower court's
finding of defendant's infringement and damages). In Gaste, the court considered the defen-
dants' appeal of ajudgment finding that the defendants' song, Feelings, infringed on the copy-
right of plaintiff's composition, Pour Toi. Id. at 1063. Affirming that defendants' song did
infringe on plaintiff's composition, the court considered whether damages were properly deter-
mined. Id. at 1069-71. The court concluded that though it was not possible to ascertain pre-
cisely how the jury determined the damages, it was reasonable to conclude thatthe jury properly
deducted business expenses and profits attributable to the defendant's efforts and lyrics. Id. at
1070-71. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision and the adjusted damages award. Id.
at 1071.
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mine the appropriate remedy, the court required the defendants to prove that
they were entitled to certain expenses incurred in producing the song.294 The
defendants also had the burden of proving what portion of the infringing
song's net profits were attributable to their lyrics."g Similarly, the court in
ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harnisongs Music, Ltd.," upon a determination of the
gross receipts attributable to the infringing song, My Sweet Lord, subtracted
business expenses attributable to the song's production as well as one quarter
of the net profit, which it attributed to the lyrics and appeal of the defendant,
ex-Beatle, George Harrison.' Thus, while this approach is novel to publicity
rights, it has been tested in other contexts.
V Application ofProportional Profits Approach to ETW
Application of this approach to the facts ofETWresults in a far different
and more just outcome than the district court's decision. First, there is no
doubt that Jireh appropriated Tiger Woods's likeness in Rush's painting, The
Masters of Augusta?9 Neither party disputes this fact.9 Second, Jireh
adequately asserted that Rush's painting contained artistic expression deserv-
ing of First Amendment protection."° It is widely accepted that art is a
protected form of expression. 1 Thus, under this Note's approach, the court
would have ordered proceedings to determine the amount of restitution due
294. Id. at 1069 (outlining burden of proof framework).
295. Id.
296. 508 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
297. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 798, 801-02
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (apportioning profits of infringing song between those due to original song and
those due to expenses, lyrical contribution, and appeal of infringer). InABKCO, the court con-
sidered what portion of the profits from a song that infringed on the copyright of another was
attributable to each party. Id. at 799-801. In 1971, George Harrison subconsciously plagiarized
the song He's o Fine in arriving at the melody of his song, My Sweet Lord. Id. at 799. Upon
a determination of copyright infringement and subsequent hearings to determine damages, the
court apportioned the net profits from the infringing song between each party. Id. at 802. The
court determined that profits of $1,599,987.00 were attributable to the music from He's So Fine
after deducting expenses and those profits attributable to Harrison's lyrics and selling power.
Id.
298. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Pub'g, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 829, 830 (N.D. Ohio 2000),
appeal docketed, No. 00-3584 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating unequivocally that Tiger Woods is sub-
ject of painting); see also supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text (discussing background of
ETR).
299. See id. (containing no reference to dispute regarding subject of painting).
300. Id. at 836 (noting that defendant's artwork conveys message and is therefore distin-
guishable from reproductions of photograph).
301. Id. at 835-36 (citing multiple cases, which state that art is protected by First Amend-
ment).
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ETW from Jireh Publishing for the infringement of Tiger Woods's publicity
rights. As in Gaste v. Kaiserman, the plaintiff would bear the burden of
presenting proof of the infringer's gross revenue."° According to an article
in the New York Times, Jireh issued 250 serigraphs, selling for seven hundred
dollars each, along with 5,000 smaller lithographs, selling for fifteen dollars
each."° Assuming all copies were sold, Jireh would gross approximately
$250,000. Once ETW established this figure, the burden would shift to Jireh
to identify those expenses solely attributable to the painting's production and
promotion.3 For demonstration, assume that Jireh is able to identify $50,000
in production and marketing expenses. This figure subtracted from gross
revenue yields a total of $200,000 to apportion.
The burden would remain with the defendant, Jireh, to establish that
portion of the net profits attributable to the painting and Rush/Jireh's reputa-
tion or appeal as an artist/publisher offine art. As discussed above, this show-
ing, although difficult to make with great precision, is similar to that required
in analogous trademark and copyright cases. 5 Thus, Jireh would present
evidence regarding the appeal of the expression itself, along with that value
which is attributable to the reputation of the artist and publisher.
In this case, Jireh could probably show that a substantial portion of the
profits is attributable to the quality of the painting and prints, as well as the
reputation of the artist, Rick Rush.3°" Rush has sold hundreds of paintings
of athletes, including Michael Jordan, John Elway, Magic Johnson, and the
University of Wisconsin football team." Rush's reputation is likely respon-
sible for much of the print's net profit. It is likely that many collectors
have purchased multiple works by Rush because of his artistic ability. Thus,
302. See Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061, 1069 (2d Cir. 1988) (stating that copyright
owner is required to present proof of gross revenue); see also supra notes 292-95 (discussing
background of Gaste).
303. See Chambers, supra note 1, at DI (reporting prices charged per customer for prints
of The Masters ofAugusta).
304. It should be noted that Jireh could not merely claim the fee it paid to Rush as an
expense. This would allow an artist to create a dummy business, which would pay the artist all
projected profits in the form of a fee, while selling the prints without profit or perhaps a loss,
which would deny the celebrity the profits attributable to him. Alternatively, ETW would have
to sue Jireh and Rush to recover his share of the profits.
305. See supra notes 291-97 and accompanying text (noting that copyright infringement
adjudication demands similarly difficult apportionment procedure).
306. The painting is quite striking, showing Woods in three positions on the golf course,
flanked by his caddy, with ghostly images of past winners looming in the background. The
Masters ofAugusta is a very attractive work of art that probably sold quite well due in large part
to its presentation.
307. See Jireh Publishing, Inc., available at http/Avww.jirehpub.om (last visited Mar. 3,
2001) (displaying Rush's paintings and prices).
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much of the appeal and, therefore, profits are attributable to Rush and Jireh
Publishing.
In rebuttal, ETW would present evidence regarding the painting's added
value attributable to Mr. Woods's inclusion as the subject of the work. ETW
should have no difficulty supplying ample evidence in this regard because
ETW's business is marketing Woods's identity."°s Considering the millions
of dollars that Mr. Woods receives each year from attaching his name to
products, including Buick automobiles, Nike sportswear, and American Ex-
press, time and the court's patience are the only limitations on ETW's ability
to offer such evidence.
3 9
In making this determination, the court should take great care not to
underestimate the profits more appropriately attributable to protected expres-
sion as was done in Gaste and ABKCO.310 In Gaste, the court noted that
although precise apportionment might not be possible, courts should err on the
side of full recovery to the plaintiff' 11 Here, where First Amendment con-
cers are present, the court should err on the side of the defendant to avoid
awarding to ETW profits due to Rush's expressive activity. Hypothetically,
the court might decide that sixty percent of the net profits from The Masters
ofAugusta is attributable to Rush's ability and reputation, while forty percent
is due to the appeal of the painting's subject, Tiger Woods. Thus, ETW's
share would be $80,000, and Jireh's share would be $120,000. While neither
side would likely be completely satisfied with this outcome, the result is
appealing in an intuitive sense, because each party would receive profits
attributable to their respective contributions.
As illustrated above, this Note proposes to accommodate First Amend-
ment concerns in right of publicity cases by following the lead of the compar-
ative negligence doctrine." 2 Rather than determining liability on an "all or
nothing" basis, this proportional profits approach apportions net profits from
the infringing use based on the relative contributions of each party. Thus, a
plaintiff will only recover the portion of profits in the venture that are due to
the plaintiff's appeal. Profits attributable to the defendant's protected expres-
308. See Chambers, supra note 1, at DI (noting that ETW Corp. was created to control
marketing of Tiger Woods's image).
309. See Greg Johnson, Woods's Cautious Approach to the Green: Golfs Young Star
Seems to Have a Long-Range Strategy That CouldLead to UnprecedentedRiches, LA TIMES,
July 26, 2000, atAl (noting several of Woods's lucrative endorsement deals).
310. For a discussion of the issues in Gaste and ABKO, see supra notes 291-97 and ae-
companying text.
311. Gaste v. Kaiserman, 863 F.2d 1061,1070 (2d Cir. 1988).
312. See supra Part IV.D-E (proposing compromise framework, which, like comparative
negligence doctrine, abandons "all or nothing" approach).
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sion remain for the defendant. Thus, that portion of the defendant's venture
attributable to the defendant's speech is unrestricted.
This Note's approach is also appealing because it removes the uncer-
tainty regarding whether or not the court would impose liability exceeding the
profits gained from the appropriation.313 Where the defendant can show an
element of protected expression, liability cannot exceed the net profits from
the venture, thus removing the chilling effect that uncertainty poses for the
speaker. Therefore, artists, activists, and other speakers will not be dissuaded
by potential liability exceeding their ability to compensate the plaintiff.
The real benefit to society may be the effect that this approach has on
litigation. As illustrated in the Tiger Woods example, the plaintiff will only
recover the portion of profits that is due to the celebrity's appeal." 4 Accord-
ingly, where either the venture was minimally profitable or the defendant's
contribution was substantial, potential plaintiffs will likely abstain from filing
expensive lawsuits. Likewise, where the profit potential is great or the defen-
dant's contribution is relatively small, the potential defendant will likely
negotiate for a license or refrain from appropriating the plaintiff's identity.
Therefore, struggling artists like those in Bery would stand to lose very little,
while an Elvis poster merchandiser would likely forgo the venture or negotiate
for a license.315
VT. Conclusion
Society's interest in open and free expression does not require its citizens
to relinquish their private property rights to further this freedom.316 However,
free expression does require a rich and fully stocked public domain to fuel
it.3 17 To that end, artists, poets, filmmakers and other speakers need access to
contemporary cultural icons in order to attach meaning to their ideas .31  A
speaker's ability to best express her ideas may be conditioned on the use of
313. See supra Part IV.D.2 (illustrating chilling effect with example of obscure artist's
decision whether or not to paint celebrity who commands exorbitant licensing fee in market-
place).
314. See supra Part V (applying Note's approach to ETW).
315. Cf. Bery v. City of New York, 97 F.3d 689 (2d Cir. 1996); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro
Arts, Inc., 496 F. Supp. 1090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
316. See Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 521-523 (1976) (ruling that striking workers
were not entitled to trespass on private property in order to engage in First Amendment
activity).
317. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors, supra note 84, at 23 (arguing that restrictions
on use of celebrity persona diminish vital public domain).
318. See Madow, supra note 83, at 239 (arguing that celebrity images should be included
in cultural commons available for use in creation of cultural meaning).
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another's persona, but "[tihe right to make a profit is not protected by the
First Amendment."" 9 Where profits derived from a speaker's use are attribut-
able to the appeal of another's identity, the speaker is unjustly enriched and
thus, should be required to relinquish that portion attributable to another's
commercial appeal. As the most recognizable name in sports art, LeRoy
Neiman, asked, "Why should an artist just looking for a hot market do some-
thing without having an arrangement? The [celebrity] is entitled to a cut."'
Restitution, in the form of an accounting for profits, accommodates society's
fundamental interest in free expression, while apportioning profits from that
expression to those who created it.
319. Holloway v. Brown, 403 N.E.2d 191, 195 (Ohio 1980) (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)).
320. Chambers, supra note 1, atD1 (quoting LeRoy Neiman).
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